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ABSTRACT
In the study of philosophies in religions, occasion-
ally, parallel concepts among the religions are also found. 
For that reason, to understand the original form and precise-
doctrine of the religions, it is essential to study their history too.
The analogy “blind and lame” found in the Visuddhimagga 
was applied by Buddhaghosa to explain the teaching of 
Dependent Origination. The same analogywas utilized by 
Iśvara Kṛṣna to explain the interrelationship betweenPrakṛ
ti and Puruṣa in Sāṅkhya Kārikā. In consequence, a doubt 
arises whether the Theravada Buddhist texts were shaded by 
non-Buddhist systems accepted soul theory. Also, this doubt 
leads to misunderstand that the teachings of the Dependent 
and Origination and Prakṛti and Puruṣa are identical. 
Nevertheless, examining the historical records related to 
these two different religious texts and their traditions, it 
is obvious that they were different teachings in different 
contexts. So, this article aims to corroborate the variationsof 
them with reference to the history of religions: Buddhism 
and Sāṅkhya. 
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Introduction
The grand commentary of Pali literature, the Visuddhimagga, 
was compiled by Buddhaghosa in Ceylon in the 5th century AD. Basing 
itself on the Tipiṭaka, it attempts to systemize the essential teachings of 
the Theravada tradition. Buddhaghosa had to deduce certain sources, 
which were not admitted by Mahāvihāra monks.1 It indicates that his 
writing was thoroughly supervised and evaluated by Mahāvihāra monks. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that some illustrations which come to light 
in the Vism are similar to those found in Buddhist Sanskrit texts.2 It is 
presumable that the Vism might be influenced by the Sāṅkhya system 
too. For instance, the following analogy found in the Sāṅkhya Kārikā3 is 
also found in the Vism:
“Tattha jaccandhopi nittejo dubbalo na sakena tejena 
sakena balena gacchati, pīṭhasappīpi nittejo dubbalo 
na sakena tejena sakenabalena gacchati, na ca tesaṃ 
aññamaññaṃ nissāya gamanaṃ nappavattati, evamevaṃ 
nāmampi nittejaṃ na sakena tejena uppajjati,”4[Here, the 
blind man is also inefficient and powerless, does not move 
with his own efficacy and power, the lame man is also 
inefficient and powerless, does not move with his own efficacy 
and power, in the absence of their mutual co-operation 
walking does not come to be, thus, Name is also inefficient 
and powerless, does not move with its own efficacy and 
power, Form is also inefficient and powerless,does not 
move with its own efficacy and power].
Apart from the above analogy, three commentaries, (the Vism, 
the Paṭisambhidāmagga-aṭṭhakathā and the Sammohavinodanī) clearly 
criticize the doctrine of Sāṅkhya by corroborating that ‘Avijjā’ is not the 
primordial entity of the world.5 Besides, defining ‘emptiness’, the Vism, 
repeatedly rejects Sāṅkhya teaching linked to Dependent Origination.6 
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Yet, Buddhaghosa takes in the analogy ‘blind and lame’ incorporated even 
in the Sāṅkhya Kārikā in his great Pali work, without any ambivalence. 
In this article, I will attempt to break through the background of how 
the Sāṅkhya teachings7 influenced the Vism with special reference to the 
analogy of ‘blind and lame.’ 
early Buddhist Aspect of the Analogy
The ‘epistemology’ involved is the way of gaining knowledge in 
regard to the world and being. The variability of the ‘theory of knowledge’ 
appears in relation to the forms of the final emancipation. Thus, Buddhism 
admits perception (including extraordinary perception)8 and inference9 
to be the epistemological means of gaining knowledge. It is to say that 
some disagreements among present scholars are set up with regard to the 
inferences discussed in Buddhist literature.10 In the Nikāya texts, the term 
‘anumāna’ and ‘anvayañāṇa’ are employed in the sense of inference.11 
Buddhist inference appeared as a correlated concept in terms of Dependent 
Origination. In this regard, Jayatilake suggests that the Buddhist 
inference is based on the ordinary and extraordinary perceptions.12 Hence, 
it is clear that this suggestion generalizes the prevalence of inference in 
early Buddhistteaching. Accordingly, the analogy can be defined as the 
technical part of the inference.13In consequence, obviously Buddhism 
also applied analogies in the way of epistemology. 
The Analogy ‘Blind and Lame’ in the Visuddhimagga
Illustrating the interdependence of Name and Form, Buddhagosa 
adopts the analogy of ‘blind and lame’ in the Diṭṭhivisuddhi-niddesa of 
the Vism. This analogy leads to the view that the Name does not exist 
without Form and vice versa.14Though the aim of using this analogy was 
to explain Buddhist doctrine, herein, Buddhaghosa had borrowed it from 
the Sāṅkhya Kārikā. Regarding this identical feature in both Vism and 
Sāṅkhya, I intend to draw four different postulates as follows.
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1. Buddhaghosa was influenced by Sāṅkhya system directly.
2. Sāṅkhya was influenced by Buddhism.
3. This was not a mistake done by Buddhaghosa. He simply 
followed the elders’ sources only.
4. The likeness of the analogy used in the Vism and the Sāṅkhya 
Kārikā is demonstrable in the sense of epistemology only, not 
incontext. 
Relationship between Buddhaghosa and sāṅkhya system
The strong Brahmanical background of Buddhaghosa inherited 
by birth signifies a possibility of Sāṅkhya philosophy influencing his 
works. Particularly, as the Mahāvaṃsa and the Buddhaghosuppatti have 
recorded, Buddhaghosa studied Brahmanic teachings and developed 
mastery in three Veda-s in his teen years.15 Moreover, the history of the 
birth of Buddhagosa (Buddhaghosuppatti) explicitly gives an account 
that Buddhaghosa was from a Brahmin family16that both Kesi and his son 
Ghosa were well-versed in three Veda-s. On the other hand, Buddhaghosa, 
before his leaving for Ceylon, made an effort to convert his father to be 
a Buddhist and succeeded.17The effort he made to convert his father also 
indicates how strong his father as a Brahmin was. However, Kosambi 
Dhammānanda traces a divergent suggestion to the facts found in the 
Mahāvaṃsa and the Buddhaghosuppatti. He emphasizes that Buddhaghosa 
was not a Brahmin.18 The attestation brought to prove his suggestion was 
that Buddhaghosa demonstrated unawareness in explaining the doctrine 
and culture of Brahmanism in India.19 Prof. Abeynayake logically overrules 
the opinion given by Kosambi Dammānanda and corroborates that 
Buddhaghosa did not think to practise further as a Brahmin since he had 
been trained in the Buddhist Order.20
Venerable Revata, the teacher of Buddhaghosa, was a great 
Theravadamonk and there is no dependable clue to conclude that Buddhaghosa 
inserted Brahmanical teachings in his works completed while he was in 
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India. On the other hand, it can be inferred that venerable Revata, after 
recognizing the non-Buddhist influence in Buddhaghosa’s works, advised 
to arrive in Ceylon and translate the Commentaries existed in Sinhalese 
as an assessmentto rectify his understanding in another way.  But, there 
are insufficient facts to support corroborating the above inference. 
Likely Buddhist Influence on sāṅkhya
The second attempt is to inquire whether this analogy appeared 
as an outcome of Buddhist influence towards the Sāṅkhya system. The 
Sāṅkhya Kārikā contains a few analogies which are parallel to Pali Post 
Canonical and Commentarial literature. Even so, the analogy ‘lame and 
blind’ in the Vism cannot be found in the Pali Canonical or Post Canonical 
literature and in consequence, this analogy can be counted as a teaching 
borrowed from Sāṅkhya. Accordingly, the Nettippakaraṇa incorporates the 
analogy milk and curd,21 which is more familiar with Sāṅkhya teachings.22 
Nevertheless, the Nettippakaraṇa falls under the category of the Post 
Canonical literature and is dated to the 1st century BCE.23 In a further 
inquiry on the Nettippakaraṇa, Norman suggests that it was compiled in 
North-India.24 As he says, the Arya meter which was familiar to Vedic 
texts have been employed in the Nettippakaraṇa and this text often was used 
by Buddhaghosain his works. If his assumption is accurate, inevitably, 
the author of the Nettippakaraṇa also was inclined to Brahmanic teachings 
like Sāṅkhya.
Besides, the historical facts revealed in the Pali literature connected 
to the Sāṅkhya also support this postulate. Unanimously, scholars accept 
that the founder of Sāṅkhya was the seer Kapila. Kapila is recognized as 
an independent seer and also a representative of the Godhead. No doubt, 
this difference damages the claim that Kapila obtained a great reputation as 
an outstanding philosopher. In any case, the correlation between Sāṅkhya 
and Upaniśad is irrefutable because the two Upaniśad texts give accounts 
of the seer Kapila, especially in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniśad.25 Moreover, 
the Bhagavad-Gita and the Mahabharata refer to the term Sāṅkhya.26 As 
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Muller finds, the classical Upaniśad refer only to two names of Indian 
philosophical systems; Sāṅkhya and Yoga.27 These factors signify that 
Kapila the founder of the Sāṅkhya philosophy has to be stratified into early 
strata of the Upaniśad (before the composition of the Bhagavad-Gita, the 
Mahabharata and the Śvetāśuatara Upaniśad.) Yet, it should be noted 
here that the name Kapila is not unique to Sāṅkhya or Hindu philosophy. 
The Uttarajjhaya, one of four Mūla texts of the Jain Canon, also gives 
details with reference to Kapila, who attained Pacceka-Buddha hood.28 
And, the Buddhist literature also holds a sizeable account of seer Kapila. 
Particularly, the Buddhist history records about two Kapilas. Therein, 
Kapila encountered in the Sutta-nipāta was an evil person.29 But, referring 
to the commentaries, the next Kapila could be recognized as a great seer, 
who practised hard practices and later on sacrificed his own monastery 
and the region to build the city Kapilavatthu.30 The Saundarānanda 
also affirms that Kapila was a great seer and he dedicated his territory 
to build Kapilavasthu .31 If the commentary of the Sutta-nipāta is 
acceptable the Kapila found in this commentary could be the same person, 
who set up the Sāṅkhya system. Also, it would be the most historical 
evidence in terms of seer Kapila or the Sāṅkhya philosophy in both Pali 
and Sanskrit literature and as such Sāṅkhya could be considered as more 
antique than Buddhism. The critical note on Sāṅkhya teachings found 
in the Pañcappakaraṇa-anu-ṭīkā would be vital source leading to clear 
evidence regarding this discussion. In this sub-commentary, venerable 
Ānanada also pointed out that Kapila was a seer who founded the Sāṅkhya 
teachings.32As modern scholars claim, the Sāṅkhya Kārikā written by 
Ishvara Kṛshṇa would be better considered as the most historical text 
in the Sāṅkhya philosophy33 Accordingly, I presume by referring to the 
attestations of the Mahabharata, the Bhagavad-Gita and the Śvetāśvatara 
Upaniśad that the Sāṅkhya teaching was found by Kapila between 7th 
century and the 5th century BCE. 
The statement, “pakati kho esā, kassapa, lokasmiṃ ‘dukkaraṃ 
sāmaññaṃ dukkaraṃ brahmañña’,34 found in the Mahāsīhanāda-sutta 
is another controversial reference to consider seriously. Maurice Walshe 
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translates the term ‘pakati’(prakṛti?); “so they say in the world.”35 It is 
observed that he evades this term ‘pakati’ without giving a direct translation. 
The commentary of the Dīgha-nikāya defines the term ‘pakati’ as a kind 
of teaching.36 Moreover, the Dīgha-nikāya-ṭīkā illustrates the term ‘pakati’ 
(prakṛti?) to be “lokasiddhavāda.”37 As Pali sub-commentarial literature 
explains, “loka-siddhavāda” can be defined in three contexts. Firstly, it 
seems to be a way of functions related to nature.38 The other meaning is 
connected to the teaching of epistemology. Particularly, defining the term 
“yathā nāmā,” the Majjhima-nikāya-ṭīkā, notes “to demonstrate that this 
is the reality, comprehending after analyzed the objects what not analyzed 
is called yathā nāmā.”39 The third context is the practice followed by 
non-Buddhist ascetics.40 So, herein the last two contexts are identical in 
both theoretically and pragmatically. The teaching of Mahāsīhanāda-sutta 
is familiar with the third explanation. In this respect, I understand the term 
“loka-siddhavāda” in the sub-commentarial literature leads to a religious 
teaching. Probably, that could be Sāṅkhya. Apparently, it can be assumed 
that the term “loka-siddhavāda” depicted in the sub-commentaries in the 
context of epistemology means “the teachings of origin or form of the 
world.” As Yoga teachings believe, “loka siddha” is a practitioner, who 
attained all yogic accomplishment.41 Therefore, it is possible to accept that 
“loka-siddhavada” signifies the teaching of Sāṅkhya because Sāṅkhya and 
Yoga are inseparable. After considering all the facts, it has to be accepted 
that by explaining “pakati” the ṭīkā literature refer to Sāṅkhya. Thus, if 
the interpretations come to light in the ṭīkā-s are acceptable, beyond a 
doubt, it should be admitted that even in Buddha’s time, the Sāṅkhya, 
which accepts primordial entities, was existent. Accordingly, a hypothesis 
can be traced whether the antiquity of Sāṅkhya was the cause to insert 
this analogy into the Vism. But, the Mahāsīhanāda-sutta contains the 
term “pakati” in the sense of nature, common or universal characteristic 
only.  The illustrations of commentators are insufficient to say that the 
Mahāsīhanāda-sutta indicates any clue regarding this discussion. And, it 
should be remembered that though we accept that the Mahāsīhanāda-sutta 
refers to Sāṅkhya system, the sutta itself demonstrates that the Buddha 
kept it away (pakati) pointing out its futility.
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Further accounts that the Sāṅkhya system existed in Buddha’s 
time are implied in the Mūlapariyāya-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya. The 
first evidence on this subject is found in the introductory note given by 
BhikkhuThanissara in his translation of the Mūlapariyāya-sutta.42 As he 
has discussed, the history of Sāṅkhya system extends back to the time of 
Uddaka and it developed up to the classical stage at the time of the Buddha. 
Bhikkhu Thanissara claims that the listeners of this sutta were mastered in 
Sāṅkhya. Consequently, because the Buddha’s explanation was not equal 
to the views they already held, they were displeased with this discourse. 
In a further inquiry into its commentary, facts may be found which partly 
advocate the aforementioned suggestion. The listeners were Brahmanas, 
and this sutta was delivered in the form of arisen needs (aṭṭhuppattika).43 
Moreover, the sutta notes that the Buddha intended to elaborate 
“the root causes of all the dhamma-s” (sabbadhamma mūlapariyāya). 
Especially, this teaching leads to substantiate non-self [(he does) not 
conceive Nibbāna, in Nibbāna, from Nibbāna or Nibbāna as mine].44 It 
indicates the listeners held a conceit on the ultimate truth and Buddha 
wanted to get rid of their conceit completely. Notably, Sāṅkhya also 
admitted theory of evolution except mūla prakṛti. In other words, Sāṅkhya 
does not accept non-self in relation to the ultimate truth (puruṣa).45 So, 
did the Buddha try to make these Brahmanas understand, who held views 
that the ultimate truth is eternal, by delivering this sutta that there is no 
self even in Nibbāna? However the followers were not pleased with the 
explanation given by the Buddha. This postulate tends to agree with the 
suggestion made by Bhikkhu Thanissara. Nevertheless, the information 
provided in the commentary is that these followers were full of conceit 
in terms of their knowledge of Buddhism and the Buddha delivered this 
sutta to demolish their conceit. The same accounts that the commentary 
has given are found in the Mūlapariyāya Jātaka too. Seemingly, the aim of 
delivering the sutta, as the commentary notes, runs counter to the Bhikkhu 
Thanissara’s suggestion. In this respect, it is difficult to come to a precise 
conclusion regarding this assumption. As I understand, without an awareness 
of the geographical background of the history of Sāṅkhya, it is difficult 
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to affirm the above argument. In other words, if we have dependable 
facts that the city Ukkaṭṭhā, where the Buddha delivered this sutta was a 
territory for Sāṅkhya followers, it could be accepted that the listeners of 
this sutta were Sāṅkhya followers. Accordingly, the second hypothesis I 
posited should be overruled due to its lack of evidence. 
Multiplicity of Sources
In line with the third point, I assume that the Vism was not 
merely an independent treatise and it was guided by the Vimuttimagga 
(Vim). But, popular opinion is that in compiling the Vism, Buddhagosa 
applied the old Sinhalese commentaries accepted by Mahāvihārins only. 
Consequently, still, there is no explicit agreement among the Pali Buddhist 
scholars that Buddhaghosa followed the Vim in compiling the Vism. To 
this point, Bapat notes;
“And so, the only  theory that seems to us as most probable, 
is the theory,no 1: That Buddhaghosa had Upatissa’s 
book, Vimuttimagga, before himand that he, taking the 
framework of the Upatissa’s Vimuttimagga,simplified 
it with his scholastic erudition and composedhis work 
Visuddhimagga, which has certainly far outshone 
Upatissa’s Vimuttimagga.”46 
As he points out, the Vism was structured as the Vim. Malalasekara 
also remarks in this regard, “There is, I feel, no need to conclude, 
therefore,that “the Visuddhimagga, which has been considered to be 
entirely Buddhaghosa’s own work is in reality a revised version of 
Upatissa’s Vimuttimagga”.47In this respect, he also partly agrees to admit 
that the Vim influenced the Vism. In this discussion, Hinuber suggests 
that the Vim was earlier than Vism and later than the commentary of the 
Paṭisambhidā.48 To the same point, Norman advocates that the Vim took 
the reins to the Vism.49 Accordingly, it is clear that the Vism was structured 
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in the shade of the Vim. In fact, this analogy is found in the Vim. So, it is 
acceptable that the Vism was shaded by the Vim.50 As modern scholars 
assume, the author of the Vim is encountered in the list of the lineage of 
the Theras.51 Also, he was living in North India, while he was composing 
the Vim.52 To the above evidence, he was an elder of Theravada lineage 
and the text was composed in India. Thus, it is possible to influence 
contemporary Sanskrit or Brahmanic literary features towards the Vim. As 
the outcome of following the Vim, the analogy ‘blind and lame’ may have 
been incorporated in the Vism. Accordingly, if we accept that compiling 
the commentaries, Buddhaghosa was interested in using trustworthy 
sources beyond elders’ notes, it is not difficult to admit that this analogy 
also was borrowed by him from the Vim. 
  
Contextual Diversity
The fourth postulate is that Buddhaghosa borrowed some analogies 
from Sāṅkhya to substantiate Buddhist teachings. In connection with it, he 
intended to use the analogy ‘blind and lame’ in the sense of epistemology 
because  it was an ideal analogy to describe Dependent Origination. 
Especially,in accordance to Sāṅkhya, Puruṣa is defined to be the psychological 
part and Prakṛti is the physical part. Prakṛti cannot move ahead just as the 
cripple cannot walk alone. The Puruṣa does not function independently 
just as the blind man cannot see, but can walk. Further, it is equal to a 
charioteer without a chariot and a chariot without a charioteer. This simile 
was appliedby Buddhaghosa to explain the interrelationship between 
Name and Form.53 In applying the analogy which comes in Sāṅkhya 
Kārikā to the context deliberated in the Vism; the Name (nāma), similar 
to the concept Puruṣa in Saṅkya like a blind man. As Sāṅkhya interprets, 
the Puruṣa is the primordial principle. Yet, the Vism has not defined 
either Name or Form to be primordial. In the same passage, Buddhaghosa, 
having cited the Nalakalāpa-sutta, substantiates that both Name and 
Form are interrelated. In addition to that, the Sāṅkhya accepts that the 
causation is allowed for Prakṛti only. In this manner, if Buddhaghosa 
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imitated outright the Sāṅkhya, he would have symbolized that causation 
is rendered in matter only. But, Buddhaghosa’s way of explaining was 
completely different in the context than the teachings of Sāṅkhya. 
Conclusion
Sāṅkhya philosophy manifests a few similarities with Buddhism 
by accepting the concept of suffering.  Besides, analyzing the analogy 
‘lame and blind’ found in the Vism, it is difficult to say unanimously that 
Buddhaghosaabsorbed the teachings of the Sāṅkhya Kārikā. In this regard 
the first hypothesis I traced should be avoided. Undoubtedly, Buddhaghosa 
had mastery of Brahmanism. But the evidence is not adequate to prove 
that the life of the Buddhaghosa was influenced by Sāṅkhya. Also, it is 
impossible to corroborate that Buddhism influenced Sāṅkhya. 
As I understand, this analogy in the Vism was the result of 
following the Vim, which was composed in North-India where the Brahmanic 
teachingscritically spread. Upatissa, the author of the Vim, was an Indian 
monk, and entered to the Buddhist Order from a Brahmin family. Therefore, 
it is possible to conclude that he thrived with traditional Brahmanical 
knowledge and he utilized the analogy to explain Buddhist doctrine. 
Also, both Buddhaghosaand Upatissa were from Brahmin families and 
were familiar with this analogy. However, it is not difficult to accept that 
Upatissa borrowed this analogy from the Sāṅkhya Kārikā This is because 
he had more freedom in compiling the commentaries than Buddhaghosa, 
who had to adhere to the rules introduced by Mahāvihāra monks. But, 
Hinuber suggests that the Vim also used the Theravada Tipiṭaka.54 Finally, 
it should be noted that even though Buddhaghosa cited the analogy, 
explicitly it can be substantiated that Buddhaghosa used the analogy which 
is found in Sāṅkhya merely in a structural manner. He had no intention 
to absorb or follow the doctrine of Sāṅkhya in the context.
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